id int64 1 978 | title stringlengths 1 120 | start_line int64 59 237k | end_line int64 132 237k | lines int64 30 3.31k | path stringlengths 27 27 | text stringlengths 577 300k |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
201 | TROJ_INJECT.AMR Low Risk Trend MicroThreat Encyclopedia. | 40,091 | 40,126 | 36 | data/reports_final/0201.txt | TROJ_INJECT.AMR Low Risk Trend MicroThreat Encyclopedia.
RetrievedNovember 21, 2011,from TrendMicro:http://about threats.trendmicro.com/malware/aspx?languageaunameTROJ_INJECT.AMR Microsoft.
(2007,December 10).Adescription of Svchost.exein Windows XP ProfessionalEdition.
Retrieved September 07,2011,fromMicrosoftSupport... |
202 | GFI SandBox Malware Analysis Report/ Trojan. | 40,143 | 40,243 | 101 | data/reports_final/0202.txt | GFI SandBox Malware Analysis Report/ Trojan.
Win32.GenericSB.Retrieved January23,2012,from GFISandBox: http://xml.ssdsandbox.net/view/228191d05a09877f90c8b802617bb25f Symantec Corporation.
(
2010,March11).Backdoor.
Sykipot At Work.
RetrievedFebruary02,2012,fromSymantec ConnectCommunity:http://www.symantec.com/connect/b... |
203 | OF29 COPYRIGHT COMMAND FIVE PTYLTD. | 40,244 | 40,289 | 46 | data/reports_final/0203.txt | OF29 COPYRIGHT COMMAND FIVE PTYLTD.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
ANNEX C SUMMARY OFXSHELL COMMANDS COMMAND COMMAND DESCRIPTION svc Service control(list/stop/start/view/install etc.
).
pslist Listsprocesses.
pskill Killsprocess.
shell Startsa commandshell.
reboot Restartsthe computer.
shutdown Shutsdown the computer.
filetime M... |
204 | ANY ADVICE OFFERED IN THIS DOCUMENTIS OFFEREDWITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. | 40,341 | 40,452 | 112 | data/reports_final/0204.txt | ANY ADVICE OFFERED IN THIS DOCUMENTIS OFFEREDWITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND.
Command Five PtyLtd ABN:49149576670 http://www.commandfive.com infocommandfive.com
THE LURID DOWNLOADER By Nart Villeneuve David Sancho TrendLabs 2 RESEARCH PAPER THE LURID DOWNLOADER CONTENTS ABSTRACT ........................................ |
205 | Fourth byte: Return code. | 40,453 | 41,607 | 1,155 | data/reports_final/0205.txt | Fourth byte: Return code.
(
This only used in the CMDDONE packet to indicate error/success).
From the Fifth byte on, the command carries parameters, which vary depending on the nature of the command.
The range of commands available to the attackers that are enumerated below demonstrate the level of control the attacker... |
206 | Satellite Image of the RGB Southern Operations Building in Pyongyang. | 41,608 | 41,762 | 155 | data/reports_final/0206.txt | Satellite Image of the RGB Southern Operations Building in Pyongyang.
(
Source) As North Koreas lead for clandestine operations, the RGB is also likely the primary cyber operations organization as well.
As described by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2015 report: The RGB is a hub of North Korean i... |
207 | 12: The geographic location of infected hosts p. 41 Fig. | 41,774 | 42,302 | 529 | data/reports_final/0207.txt | 12: The geographic location of infected hosts p. 41 Fig.
13.
GhostNet infection timeline p. 45 5JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - SUMMARY Summary Trojan horse programmes and other associated malware are often cited as vectors for conducting sophisticated computer-based espionage.
Allegations of cyber espionage (computer ... |
208 | The Information Warfare Monitor engages in three primary activities: 1. | 42,303 | 42,412 | 110 | data/reports_final/0208.txt | The Information Warfare Monitor engages in three primary activities: 1.
Case Studies.
We design and carry out active case study research.
These are self-generated activities consistent with our mission.
We employ a rigorous and multidisciplinary approach to all our case studies blending qualitative, technical, and quan... |
209 | THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAiGN The CC traffic size also varied in previous versions. | 42,413 | 42,603 | 191 | data/reports_final/0209.txt | THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAiGN The CC traffic size also varied in previous versions.
Some early variants used traffic that are 28H (40 bytes) and 1004H (4,100 bytes) in size.
Additionally, the port, CC address, campaign code and password are hardcoded in the RATs malware body in plain text.
In some RAT versions, however, t... |
210 | HackTool. | 42,604 | 42,649 | 46 | data/reports_final/0210.txt | HackTool.
CobaltStrike.1 HX Detect XSLM Macro launch Malware Object HX Detect BEACON written to disk Backdoor.
BEACON NX Block BEACON Callback FE_Malformed_RTF EX/ETP/NX Block RTF Malware.
Binary.rtf EX/ETP/NX Block RTF Malware.
Binary EX/ETP/NX Block RTF Malware.
Binary.xlsx EX/ETP/NX Block XSLM Table 1: Detection rev... |
211 | DEEP PANDA INTELLIGENCE TEAM REPORT VER. | 42,650 | 43,486 | 837 | data/reports_final/0211.txt | DEEP PANDA INTELLIGENCE TEAM REPORT VER.
1.0 DEEP PANDA 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 21 1 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 3 Dropper Sample (MD5: 14c04f88dc97aef3e9b516ef208a2bf5) 3 Backdoor DLL Sample (MD5: 47619fca20895abc83807321cbb80a3d) 5 Initial C2 Phone Home Beacon 6 Network Protocol and Implementation 7 Backdoor Functionality, Suppor... |
212 | 14] DEEP END RESEARCH. | 43,526 | 43,570 | 45 | data/reports_final/0212.txt | 14] DEEP END RESEARCH.
Library of Malware Traffic Patterns, 2013.
[
15] FAGERLAND, S. The Many Faces of Gh0st Rat.
Tech.
rep.,
Norman, 2012.
[
16] FAGERLAND, S. PlugX used against Mongolian targets.
Tech.
rep.,
2013.
[
17] FIRST.
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS-SIG), 2007.
[
18] GALPERIN, EVA, MARQUIS-BOIRE, ... |
213 | Unveiling Careto - The Masked APT. | 43,594 | 43,635 | 42 | data/reports_final/0213.txt | Unveiling Careto - The Masked APT.
Tech.
rep.,
2014.
[
30] KIRLAPPOS, I., AND SASSE, M.-A.
Security Education against Phishing: A Modest Proposal for a Major Rethink.
Security Pri- vacy, IEEE 10, 2 (Mar.
2012), 2432.
[
31] KREBS, B.
Espionage Hackers Target Watering Hole Sites, 2012.
[
32] LI, F., LAI, A., AND DDL, D. ... |
214 | For Their Eyes Only: The Commercial- ization of Digital Spying. | 43,636 | 43,686 | 51 | data/reports_final/0214.txt | For Their Eyes Only: The Commercial- ization of Digital Spying.
Tech.
rep.,
Citizen Lab, University of Toronto, 2013.
[
39] MAURER, M.-E., AND HOFER, L. Sophisticated Phishers Make More Spelling Mistakes: Using URL Similarity against Phishing.
In CSS (2012), pp.
414426.
[
40] MCAFEE.
Enfal, 2008.
[
41] MICROSOFT CORPOR... |
215 | 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns. | 43,702 | 43,937 | 236 | data/reports_final/0215.txt | 2Q Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns.
Tech.
rep.,
2013.
[
57] TZERMIAS, Z., SYKIOTAKIS, G., POLYCHRONAKIS, M., AND MARKATOS, E. P. Combining Static and Dynamic Analysis for the Detection of Malicious Documents.
In Proceedings of the Fourth European Workshop on System Security (New York, NY, USA, 2011), EUROSEC 11, AC... |
216 | Operation Saffron Rose. | 43,938 | 44,370 | 433 | data/reports_final/0216.txt | Operation Saffron Rose.
FireEye.
13 May 2014.
Web.
http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/ malware-research/2014/05/operation-saffron-rose.html 8 The New York Times publicly disclosed their breach by APT12, which they assess was motivated by the China-based actors need to know what the newspaper was publishing about a c... |
217 | Haaretz.com: Israels Foreign Ministry targeted by computer virus bearing IDF chiefs name. | 44,371 | 44,504 | 134 | data/reports_final/0217.txt | Haaretz.com: Israels Foreign Ministry targeted by computer virus bearing IDF chiefs name.
[
Online] http://www.haaretz.com/blogs/diplomania/israel-s-foreign-ministry-targeted-by- computer-virus-bearing-idf-chief-s-name.premium-1.472278.
Norman, November 2012 23 Appendix A: CC hostnames may2008.dyndns.info menu.dyndns... |
218 | McAfee Network Security Platform: blocks malicious network activity such as APT command and control traffic. | 44,505 | 44,535 | 31 | data/reports_final/0218.txt | McAfee Network Security Platform: blocks malicious network activity such as APT command and control traffic.
McAfee Enterprise Firewall: Properly installed and configured at the border and inside your organization, McAfee Firewall would have prevented the Night Dragon operation from penetrating so deeply into the affec... |
219 | 16 White Paper Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon 6. | 44,548 | 44,645 | 98 | data/reports_final/0219.txt | 16 White Paper Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon 6.
When a client is executed, it connects to the attackers zwShell interface, along with its IP address, PC name, name of the logged-in user, and information about the operating system (OS) version of the machine, including the major patch levels.
7.
The attacker ... |
220 | Password Logger: The malware includes a feature to steal browser credentials. | 44,646 | 45,030 | 385 | data/reports_final/0220.txt | Password Logger: The malware includes a feature to steal browser credentials.
The theft is performed by a specific component that enumerates credentials saved in various browsers.
For each entry, it saves the website URL, the username and the password.
Process manager: The attacker can obtain a list of running processe... |
221 | The web shells used are: PhpSpy b374k 2.7 Older b374k web shell b374k web shells login page on the compromised site. | 45,031 | 45,401 | 371 | data/reports_final/0221.txt | The web shells used are: PhpSpy b374k 2.7 Older b374k web shell b374k web shells login page on the compromised site.
23/32 Older Perl-based b374k web shell hosted on a compromised site.
The attackers also deployed a file uploader utility (created by Pakistan Haxors Crew) to upload files to the sites without having to g... |
222 | Campaign Arabic Title Translation 2015 Kaspersky Campaign exe. | 45,402 | 45,619 | 218 | data/reports_final/0222.txt | Campaign Arabic Title Translation 2015 Kaspersky Campaign exe.
Leaked conversation with the Egyptian leader of military forces Sodqi Sobhi[.
]exe December 2021 Campaign Secret meeting between bin Salman and Erdogan in Qatar The campaigns observed by Proofpoint likely occurred concurrently to Zscalers recently publ... |
223 | Backdoor. | 45,678 | 46,623 | 946 | data/reports_final/0223.txt | Backdoor.
RemexiactivityinparticularisreminiscentofOperationCleaver,as documentedbyCylance (http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/270968/assets/Cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf), andmaypossiblybeacontinuationofthatactivity.
CadelleandChafersmalware Thegroupsuseonemalwarefamilyeachtoopenabackdoorandstealinformationf... |
224 | ClamAV names and Snort Signature IDs detecting Group 72 RAT malware: Gh0stRat Win. | 46,624 | 46,913 | 290 | data/reports_final/0224.txt | ClamAV names and Snort Signature IDs detecting Group 72 RAT malware: Gh0stRat Win.
Trojan.
Gh0stRAT, 19484, 27964 PoisonIVY / DarkMoon Win.
Trojan.
DarkMoon, 7816, 7815, 7814, 7813, 12715, 12724 Hydraq Win.
Trojan.
HyDraq, 16368, 21304 HiKit Win.
Trojan.
HiKit, 30948 Zxshell Win.
Trojan.
Zxshell, 32180, 32181 Depu... |
225 | B Backdoor. | 46,970 | 47,390 | 421 | data/reports_final/0225.txt | B Backdoor.
Pirpi.
C Backdoor.
Pirpi.
D Downloader.
Pirpi Downloader.
Pirpig1 Intrusion prevention system System Infected: Backdoor.
Pirpi Activity 3 UpdateSeptember 14, 2016: Indicators of compromise We have compiled a list of indicators of compromise for the campaigns described in this blog.
Symantec Security Respons... |
226 | 14 2015: Continuing surgical strikes with CosmicDuke . | 47,477 | 47,590 | 114 | data/reports_final/0226.txt | 14 2015: Continuing surgical strikes with CosmicDuke .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14 TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES OF THE DUKES 16 PinchDuke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
16 GeminiDuke.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... |
227 | 2012: Hiding in the shadows We still know surprisingly few specifics about the Dukes groups activities during 2012. | 47,591 | 47,924 | 334 | data/reports_final/0227.txt | 2012: Hiding in the shadows We still know surprisingly few specifics about the Dukes groups activities during 2012.
Based on samples of Duke malware from 2012, the Dukes do appear to have continued actively using and developing all of their tools.
Of these, CosmicDuke and MiniDuke appear to have been in more active use... |
228 | Exploit Database CVE: 2010-4398 published 24 November 2014 [Online]. | 47,962 | 48,005 | 44 | data/reports_final/0228.txt | Exploit Database CVE: 2010-4398 published 24 November 2014 [Online].
Available: https://www.exploit-db.
com/exploits/15609/ 22.
FireEye HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat Group published July 2015 [Online].
Available: https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf 23.
tz... |
229 | A Note: F-Secure also detects various Duke malware components with other detections not specific to the Dukes. | 48,006 | 48,441 | 436 | data/reports_final/0229.txt | A Note: F-Secure also detects various Duke malware components with other detections not specific to the Dukes.
Executive summary The story of the Dukes Etymology: a note on names 2008: Chechnya 2009: First known campaigns against the West 2010: The emergence of CosmicDuke in the Caucasus 2011: John Kasai of Klagenfurt,... |
230 | Section Summary: The Derusbi / Sakula malware seen in both the we11point[. | 48,442 | 48,742 | 301 | data/reports_final/0230.txt | Section Summary: The Derusbi / Sakula malware seen in both the we11point[.
]com and VAE Inc. campaigns were structurally the same and digitally signed with the DTOPTOOLZ signature.
http://www.threatconnect.com/news/the-anthem-... 14 of 33 03/22/2015 10:14 PM The emerging theme is that this particular signature and fami... |
231 | R... 00000090 FF 58 30 3D A8 8A DD 4D 3F DB AE 9A F5 07 3B 21 .X0...M?..... | 48,743 | 48,895 | 153 | data/reports_final/0231.txt | R... 00000090 FF 58 30 3D A8 8A DD 4D 3F DB AE 9A F5 07 3B 21 .X0...M?.....
000000A0 67 5A 34 22 AD 60 CB DD A4 E2 B5 77 A1 6A 4C 2E gZ4......w.jL.
000000B0 C8 75 91 01 CA 5B B3 28 3E 55 C8 68 B2 2C 40 E4 .u...[.
(U.h.,.
000000C0 02 A9 64 8B 80 BD 0E AB 58 25 00 40 6E AB DD 5B ..d.....X.n..[ 000000D0 D1 0A 32 AE 4A... |
232 | The answer: No. | 48,896 | 49,008 | 113 | data/reports_final/0232.txt | The answer: No.
Bootkits must overwrite the Master Boot Record (MBR) and antivirus products are well trained to catch that kind of bad behavior.
The masterminds behind Snake rootkit seem to be well aware of this so what they resorted to instead is leveraging a vulnerability in a well-known virtualization product called... |
233 | IOCs Domain names APK hashes androidbak[. | 49,020 | 49,377 | 358 | data/reports_final/0233.txt | IOCs Domain names APK hashes androidbak[.
]com droidback[.
]com endpointup[.
]com siteanalysto[.
]com goodydaddy[.
]com 10f27d243adb082ce0f842c7a4a3784b01f7248e b8237782486a26d5397b75eeea7354a777bff63a 09c3af7b0a6957d5c7c80f67ab3b9cd8bef88813 9b923303f580c999f0fdc25cad600dd3550fe4e0 0b58c883efe44ff010f1703db00c9ff4645... |
234 | Stage 2: Attack Loss of Control Host SHA1 File Hash 94488F214B165512D2FC0438A581F- 5C9E3BD4D4C Module for 104 effect. | 49,378 | 49,466 | 89 | data/reports_final/0234.txt | Stage 2: Attack Loss of Control Host SHA1 File Hash 94488F214B165512D2FC0438A581F- 5C9E3BD4D4C Module for 104 effect.
Exports Crash which is invoked by launcher.
Functional- ity requires config file.
Stage 2: Attack Loss of Control Host SHA1 File Hash 5A5FAFBC3FEC8D36FD57B075EBF- 34119BA3BFF04 Wiper module, wipes list ... |
235 | and Russian Cyber Operations on Steroids. | 49,467 | 49,575 | 109 | data/reports_final/0235.txt | and Russian Cyber Operations on Steroids.
[
UPDATE] October 7th 2016 Introduction Since posting about the DNC hack, each time we published a blog post on a BEAR-based topic we thought it was going to be our last.
But like the Death Stars gravitational pull, the story keeps drawing us back in as new information comes to... |
236 | We came up with two scenarios: Stronger/Closer Coordination Between FANCY BEAR and CyberBerkut. | 49,576 | 49,722 | 147 | data/reports_final/0236.txt | We came up with two scenarios: Stronger/Closer Coordination Between FANCY BEAR and CyberBerkut.
In this scenario, the activities against Bellingcat are coordinated with these two entities handing off operations.
The timing suggests that the state actors, looking to compromise Bellingcat, pivoted to a more aggressive at... |
237 | Were dubbing this attack Operation GreedyWonk. | 49,723 | 49,775 | 53 | data/reports_final/0237.txt | Were dubbing this attack Operation GreedyWonk.
We believe GreedyWonk may be related to a May 2012 campaign outlined by ShadowServer, based on consistencies in tradecraft (particularly with the websites chosen for this strategic Web compromise), attack infrastructure, and malware configuration properties.
The group behi... |
238 | MD5 Family Compile Time Alternate C2s 7995a9a6a889b914e208eb924e459ebc PlugX 2012-06-09 fuckchina.govnb[. | 49,776 | 49,840 | 65 | data/reports_final/0238.txt | MD5 Family Compile Time Alternate C2s 7995a9a6a889b914e208eb924e459ebc PlugX 2012-06-09 fuckchina.govnb[.
]com bf60b8d26bc0c94dda2e3471de6ec977 PlugX 2010-03-15 microsafes.no-ip[.
]org fd69793bd63c44bbb22f9c4d46873252 Poison Ivy 2013-03-07 N/A 88b375e3b5c50a3e6c881bc96c926928 Poison Ivy 2012-06-11 N/A cd07a9e49b1f909e1... |
239 | Image 9: Keylogger Artifacts We see the unique strings that the keylogger uses to record the data entered by the user. | 49,841 | 50,010 | 170 | data/reports_final/0239.txt | Image 9: Keylogger Artifacts We see the unique strings that the keylogger uses to record the data entered by the user.
We find a lot of encrypted strings in the executable file.
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0a4f2cff4d4613c08b39c9f18253af0fd356697368eecddf7c0fa560386377e6/detection https://www.virustotal.com/gui/... |
240 | Analysis: Malware Installation This malware unpacks its main executable in memory and executes it. | 50,011 | 50,158 | 148 | data/reports_final/0240.txt | Analysis: Malware Installation This malware unpacks its main executable in memory and executes it.
It then drops a config file in the appdata\Mozilla folder as well as copy of itself with the filename svchost.exe.
The config filename is a base64 string comprising of a unique string and the MAC address of the infected s... |
241 | FHDRtr Malicious DLL Mon Sep 07 01:54:17 2015 b9af5f5fd434a65d7aa1b55f5441c90a adobe.dat 5 Trojan-FHDR Backdoor. | 50,159 | 50,502 | 344 | data/reports_final/0241.txt | FHDRtr Malicious DLL Mon Sep 07 01:54:17 2015 b9af5f5fd434a65d7aa1b55f5441c90a adobe.dat 5 Trojan-FHDR Backdoor.
HIXOR.A Trojan.
Atr Malicious DLL Wed Apr 22 04:58:34 2015 Indicator List: File Entrenchment Paths: TEMP\Center1[Decimal_Result_of_GetTickCount].dat TEMP\Center[Decimal_Result_of_GetTickCount].dat AppData\ad... |
242 | FE_APT_Trojan_Zumkong Trojan. | 50,643 | 51,305 | 663 | data/reports_final/0242.txt | FE_APT_Trojan_Zumkong Trojan.
APT.Zumkong WINERACK WINERACK is backdoor whose primary features include user and host information gathering, process creation and termination, filesystem and registry manipulation, as well as the creation of a reverse shell that utilizes statically-linked Wine cmd.exe code to emulate Wind... |
243 | 27 IOCs C2: 198.55.120[. | 51,358 | 51,388 | 31 | data/reports_final/0243.txt | 27 IOCs C2: 198.55.120[.
]143 TCP/7386 and/or TCP/8080 MD5 (RTF): da97c88858214242374f27d32e27d957 MD5 (E804.tmp): e4e8493898d94f737ff4dc8fab743a4a MD5 (bait file): 9ae498307da6c2e677a97a458bff1aea SHA-256 (RTF): 647b443ecaa38d2834e5681f20540fa84a5cf2b7e1bee6a2524ce59783cb8d1b SHA-256 (E804.tmp: 5f3d0a319ecc875cc64a40a... |
244 | IOCs C2: 198.55.120[. | 51,389 | 51,457 | 69 | data/reports_final/0244.txt | IOCs C2: 198.55.120[.
]143 tcp/7386 MD5 (malicious RTF): facd2fbf26e974bdeae3e4db19753f03 MD5 (T9000, BC29.tmp): e4e8493898d94f737ff4dc8fab743a4a Bait filename (tmp.doc): One Tibetan Protester is Freed, Two Others Are Jailed.doc MD5 (tmp.doc): 751196ce79dacd906eec9b5a1c92890b SHA-256: (malicious RTF): 1140e06fa8580cf86... |
245 | IOCs C2: 59.188.12[. | 51,458 | 51,524 | 67 | data/reports_final/0245.txt | IOCs C2: 59.188.12[.
]123 TCP/8008 MD5 (RTF): 09ddd70517cb48a46d9f93644b29c72f MD5 (tmp.doc): e6ad959a18725954a56a7954d3f47671 MD5 (RAR): d8becbd6f188e3fb2c4d23a2d36d137b MD5 (iuso.exe): 07eb4867e436bbef759a9877402af994 MD5 (wget.bat): 47e60e347b5791d5f17939f9c97fee01 MD5 (wget.exe): f9f8d1c53d312f17c6f830e7b4e6651d MD... |
246 | IOCs C2: 198.55.120[. | 51,525 | 51,662 | 138 | data/reports_final/0246.txt | IOCs C2: 198.55.120[.
]143:7386 C2: URL: http://198.55.120[.
]143:7386/B/ResN32.dll MD5 (RTF): 98bcd226890c5c2694ef9a34a23c9fbf MD5 (Elevate.dll): 1d335f6a58cb9fab503a9b9cb371f57b MD5 (QQMgr.dll): b9c584c7c34d14599de8cd3b72f2074b MD5 (QQMgr.inf): 8ac933be588f49560179c26ddbc6a753 MD5 (ResN32.dat): 50753c28878ce10a748fbd... |
247 | TRINITY IS POS MALWARE THAT ATTEMPTS TO LOCATE AND STEAL PAYMENT CARD DATA FROM MEMORY. | 51,663 | 51,728 | 66 | data/reports_final/0247.txt | TRINITY IS POS MALWARE THAT ATTEMPTS TO LOCATE AND STEAL PAYMENT CARD DATA FROM MEMORY.
The malware first creates mutexes named m_number3 and MuTex-Check and exits if either already exists.
The malware then continuously iterates over the current process listing and examines the memory space of each process.
Processes w... |
248 | 4 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreportskaspersky.com 4. | 51,729 | 51,845 | 117 | data/reports_final/0248.txt | 4 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreportskaspersky.com 4.
User name, local group name.
5.
Common directory names: system, current, temporary directories.
6.
Additional system information: System and user language settings User locale information: country name, current date, time zone.
Uptime 7.
Disk spac... |
249 | Turla and Trojan. | 51,875 | 51,915 | 41 | data/reports_final/0249.txt | Turla and Trojan.
Wipbot.
It is believed that Trojan.
Turla is also dropped in tandem with Trojan.
Wipbot in order to provide multiple communication channels as a failsafe when interacting with the compromised computer.
Symantec has also observed the attackers using Trojan.
Wipbot to download updated versions of Trojan... |
250 | Turla or Trojan. | 51,916 | 52,062 | 147 | data/reports_final/0250.txt | Turla or Trojan.
Wipbot is installed onto the victims computer.
MALWARE Page 10 The Waterbug attack group Malware Whether compromised by a targeted email attack or by browsing to an infected website on the Venom network, in both cases either Trojan.
Turla or Trojan.
Wipbot is installed onto the victims computer.
Trojan... |
251 | v_ja Enabled Java Runtime Environment ref Enabled Compromised site v_sl Enabled Silverlight. | 52,063 | 52,108 | 46 | data/reports_final/0251.txt | v_ja Enabled Java Runtime Environment ref Enabled Compromised site v_sl Enabled Silverlight.
Only present in main.php (MD5: bd07a78793641dc85cf75dc60c06051a).
Page 17 The Waterbug attack group All plugin scripts use the PluginDetect library from version 0.8.5 with the exception of main.php (MD5: bd07a78793641dc85cf75dc... |
252 | C9 75 26 56 0F 20 C6 8B C6 25 FF FF FE FF 0F 22 C0 E8 condition: all of them Trojan. | 52,188 | 52,248 | 61 | data/reports_final/0252.txt | C9 75 26 56 0F 20 C6 8B C6 25 FF FF FE FF 0F 22 C0 E8 condition: all of them Trojan.
Turla DLL rule turla _ dll strings: a /([A-Za-z0-9]2,10 _ ),2Win32\.dll\x00/ condition: pe.exports(ee) and a FA rule fa strings: mz MZ string1 C:\\proj\\drivers\\fa _ 2009\\objfre\\i386\\atmarpd.pdb Page 26 The Waterbug attack gro... |
253 | Turla Conclusion Appendix Injection attack analysis PluginDetect library Exploits Trojanized applications Trojan. | 52,249 | 52,644 | 396 | data/reports_final/0253.txt | Turla Conclusion Appendix Injection attack analysis PluginDetect library Exploits Trojanized applications Trojan.
Turla variants Detection guidance Waterbug tools Additional exploits used Samples Trojan.
Turla CC servers
Take Back Command-and-Control The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet History, Patterns and Find... |
254 | Both families use two sets of domains: one for serving malware and the other for CnC. | 52,645 | 52,895 | 251 | data/reports_final/0254.txt | Both families use two sets of domains: one for serving malware and the other for CnC.
The droppers and dropped files were compiled using Microsoft Compilers.
This is evidenced by the presence of the string Rich before the PE header.
This watermark is undocumented, meaning there is no mention of this watermark from Micr... |
255 | Panda Security 2015. | 52,896 | 52,928 | 33 | data/reports_final/0255.txt | Panda Security 2015.
All Rights Reserved.
Houdinis Magic Reappearance researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com /2016/10/unit42-houdinis-magic-reappearance/ By Anthony Kasza and Esmid Idrizovic Unit 42 has observed a new version of Hworm (or Houdini) being used within multiple attacks.
This blog outlines technical details of... |
256 | The VBS Loader: The script contains three files encoded in base64. | 52,929 | 53,037 | 109 | data/reports_final/0256.txt | The VBS Loader: The script contains three files encoded in base64.
The first file is DynamicWrapperX (DCOM_DATA), the second file is the RunPE shellcode (LOADER_DATA), and the third file is the file which gets injected into host process (FILE_DATA).
DynamicWrapperX provides access to all Windows APIs from a Visual Basi... |
257 | Full Exploit Flow 1. | 53,066 | 53,147 | 82 | data/reports_final/0257.txt | Full Exploit Flow 1.
Create a new Video object 2.
Fetch the payload 3.
Attach the video to a new NetStream 4.
Spray the heap with Adobe Flash Player Vectors a.
Create a Vector containing 98688 Vectors containing 1022 uints b.
Set the first two dwords in each Vectoruint to 0x41414141, 0x42424242 5.
Create holes for the ... |
258 | 26 Appendix A: Malware Key Findings pg. | 53,164 | 53,484 | 321 | data/reports_final/0258.txt | 26 Appendix A: Malware Key Findings pg.
27 Hikit Generation 1 pg.
27 Hikit Generation 2 pg.
28 Zox Family pg.
28 Derusbi (Server Variant) pg.
29 Appendix C: Signatures pg.
30 Yara Signature Links pg.
30 IDS signatures pg.
30 Appendix D: Malware Names Index pg.
30 Appendix E: Malware Hashes pg.
31 3 Caveats Op... |
259 | AttAcK AnAlysis kaspersky lab verdict: exploit.mSWord. | 53,485 | 53,869 | 385 | data/reports_final/0259.txt | AttAcK AnAlysis kaspersky lab verdict: exploit.mSWord.
cve-2010-3333.cl the exploit drops temp\netmgr.dll temp\netmgr.exe temp\perf2012.ini temp\sysinfo2012.dll temp\winlogin.exe the malware command and control server script is at hxxp://www.faceboak.net/2012nt/ nettraveler.asp.
mD5 b600089a93275fa935 58695b707b87ad cr... |
260 | Threat Advisory 1007 Rev. | 53,870 | 53,905 | 36 | data/reports_final/0260.txt | Threat Advisory 1007 Rev.
2012-11-01 Recovering From Shamoon Copyright 2012 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Page 1 of 9 Fidelis Threat Advisory 1007 RECOVERING FROM SHAMOON November 1, 2012 Document Status: FINAL Last Revised: 2012-11-01 Executive Summary The Shamoon malware has received considerable ... |
261 | Example of wiped of MBR and VBR wiped by Shamoon Malware. | 53,906 | 54,002 | 97 | data/reports_final/0261.txt | Example of wiped of MBR and VBR wiped by Shamoon Malware.
Figure 1 was found at the MBR (Sector 0) and the VBR (Sector 63/56 (XP, 2003), and 2048/206848 (7)) of each of the operating systems (As well as throughout the drive).
Fidelis www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com FidSecSys 1 800.652.4020 Threat Advisory 10... |
262 | Other indicators of CC communication: Google and Twitter queries......................................18 1. | 54,003 | 54,551 | 549 | data/reports_final/0262.txt | Other indicators of CC communication: Google and Twitter queries......................................18 1.
Introduction Our malware analysis team in the CrySyS Lab, Budapest worked together with Kaspersky Labs on the analysis of the Miniduke malware.
Our participation in this research was justified by a detected Hunga... |
263 | Note: These maps do not provide data for Crimea. | 54,552 | 54,712 | 161 | data/reports_final/0263.txt | Note: These maps do not provide data for Crimea.
According to various sources, there are estimates suggesting that, in greater Crimea 80 speak Russian, 10 speak Ukrainian, and 10 speak Tatar.
The percentage of Russian speakers is estimated to be higher in Sevastopol, most likely dues to the Russian Naval Base in the re... |
264 | Lua modules: Several examples of Remsec use modules written in the Lua programming language. | 54,713 | 54,990 | 278 | data/reports_final/0264.txt | Lua modules: Several examples of Remsec use modules written in the Lua programming language.
Remsec uses a Lua interpreter to run Lua modules which perform various functions.
These Lua modules are stored in the same executable blob format as the loader.
Lua modules include: Network loader This loads an executable over... |
265 | E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y a. | 55,013 | 55,125 | 113 | data/reports_final/0265.txt | E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y a.
Despite early reporting indicating that disruptions in Brazils electrical grid in 2007 were the result of a cyberattack, further investigation ultimately attributed the blackouts to inadequate maintenance.
www.boozallen.com/ICS 1 Shortly before sunset on December 23, 2015, hac... |
266 | DELIVERY STEP 3: DELIVER RAT Threat actors initiate phishing campaign against electricity distributors. | 55,169 | 55,208 | 40 | data/reports_final/0266.txt | DELIVERY STEP 3: DELIVER RAT Threat actors initiate phishing campaign against electricity distributors.
Location: Corporate network Action: Active threat actor activity Timeline: May 2014June 2015e Device/application: Employee workstations, likely using MS Windows OS and provisioned with MS Internet Explorer web browse... |
267 | Exploitation method: Threat actors use delivered BlackEnergy 3 plugins to gather stored credentials or log keystrokes. | 55,209 | 55,242 | 34 | data/reports_final/0267.txt | Exploitation method: Threat actors use delivered BlackEnergy 3 plugins to gather stored credentials or log keystrokes.
After gathering valid credentials for user with administrator privileges, threat actors use the stolen administrator credentials to access the domain controller, recover additional creden- tials, and c... |
268 | Step 15: Telephony Denial-of-Service Attack. | 55,254 | 55,286 | 33 | data/reports_final/0268.txt | Step 15: Telephony Denial-of-Service Attack.
Threat actors initiate DoS attack on telephone call center at one of the targeted distributors.
Step 16: Disable Critical Systems via UPS Outage.
Previously scheduled UPS outage cuts power to targeted telephone communications server and data center servers.
Step 17: Destroy ... |
269 | 22 Booz Allen Hamilton T O P 1 0 TA K E A W AY S What to Consider When Protecting Your OT Environment 1. | 55,322 | 55,448 | 127 | data/reports_final/0269.txt | 22 Booz Allen Hamilton T O P 1 0 TA K E A W AY S What to Consider When Protecting Your OT Environment 1.
Know your environment.
Identifying risk starts with the need to understand your operational environment, including the topology, network and wireless connection points, and connected devices and assets.
Starting w... |
270 | A P P E N D I X A : Detailed Textual Description of Attack Walk Through j. | 55,449 | 55,586 | 138 | data/reports_final/0270.txt | A P P E N D I X A : Detailed Textual Description of Attack Walk Through j.
An in-depth analysis of the weaponized file samples and recovered VBA scripts recovered for this report are provided in Appendix B. boozallen.com/ics 29 DELIVERY STEP 3: DELIVER REMOTE ACCESS TROJAN (RAT) Public reporting consistently i... |
271 | Which beacons to 5.149.254.114:80 boozallen.com/ics 43 Related Samples: 1. | 55,587 | 55,649 | 63 | data/reports_final/0271.txt | Which beacons to 5.149.254.114:80 boozallen.com/ics 43 Related Samples: 1.
Appendix B.8: BE3 Implant (FONTCACHE.DAT, Sample 2) (MD5: cdfb4cda9144d01fb26b5449f9d189ff) 2.
Appendix B.9 BE3 Implant (.LNK Persistence Mechanism, Sample 2) (MD5: bffd06a38a46c1fe2bde0317176f04b8) A P P E N D I X B .
5 : BE2 INSTALLER... |
272 | boozallen.com/ics 49 A P P E N D I X B . | 55,650 | 55,710 | 61 | data/reports_final/0272.txt | boozallen.com/ics 49 A P P E N D I X B .
1 1 : BE2 IMPLANT (ADPU160M.SYS) SHA1: 4bc2bbd1809c8b66eecd7c28ac319b948577de7b SHA-256: 244dd8018177ea5a92c70a7be94334fa457c1aab8a1c1ea51580d7da500c3ad5 MD5: e60854c96fab23f2c857dd6eb745961c Type: Win32 Executable253 First Upload: 2015-10-09 16:26:08 UTC254 Compile Tim... |
273 | Related Samples: N/A 56 Booz Allen Hamilton A P P E N D I X B . | 55,737 | 55,768 | 32 | data/reports_final/0273.txt | Related Samples: N/A 56 Booz Allen Hamilton A P P E N D I X B .
1 8 : KILLDISK (SAMPLE 5) SHA1: 6d6ba221da5b1ae1e910bbeaa07bd44aff26a7c0 SHA-256: 11b7b8a7965b52ebb213b023b6772dd2c76c66893fc96a18a9a33c8cf125af80 MD5: 66676deaa9dfe98f8497392064aefbab Type: Win32 Executable298 First Upload: 2015-10-25 23:07:26299 Compile... |
274 | A P P E N D I X D : Alternate Remote Access Trojans av. | 55,769 | 56,441 | 673 | data/reports_final/0274.txt | A P P E N D I X D : Alternate Remote Access Trojans av.
Appendix B.6: Dropbear Installer (DropbearRun.vbs) (MD5: 0af5b1e8eaf5ee4bd05227bf53050770) boozallen.com/ics 61 1.
IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, US Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control System ... |
275 | BlackEnergy and the Ukraine: Signals vs. | 56,442 | 56,987 | 546 | data/reports_final/0275.txt | BlackEnergy and the Ukraine: Signals vs.
Noise, Cylance, January 12, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://blog.cylance.com/ blackenergy-and-the-ukraine-signals-vs.-noise.
78 Booz Allen Hamilton JAKE STYCZYNSKI Jake Styczynski is an associate at Booz Allen Hamilton specializing in cyber threat research.
He has conducte... |
276 | The Komplex Binder: Is the main executable of roskosmos_2015-2025.app. | 56,988 | 57,030 | 43 | data/reports_final/0276.txt | The Komplex Binder: Is the main executable of roskosmos_2015-2025.app.
Its main purpose is to save a second payload(the dropper) on the system and open the decoy pdf file pictured below.
v7 objc_msgSend(OBJC_CLASS___NSString, stringWithFormat:, CFSTR(/roskosmos_2015-2025.pdf), v6) v8 objc_msgSend(OBJC_CLASS___NSStrin... |
277 | MainHandler: handles CC commands and controls the other modules based on the commands it receives from the CC. | 57,031 | 57,061 | 31 | data/reports_final/0277.txt | MainHandler: handles CC commands and controls the other modules based on the commands it receives from the CC.
case e: getInfoOSX case f: getProcessList case g: remoteShell case h: getInstalledAPP case i: showBackupIosFolder case j: downloadFileFromPath case k: createFileInSystem case l: execFile case m: deletFileFrom... |
278 | Cryptor: The cryptographic engine used to encrypt communication with the CC server. | 57,062 | 57,662 | 601 | data/reports_final/0278.txt | Cryptor: The cryptographic engine used to encrypt communication with the CC server.
CryptoContainer::cryptRc4(uchar ,uint,uint) CryptoContainer::decryptData(uchar ,uint,uint ) Mac Linux HTTPChannel HTTPChannel MainHandler AgentKernel CameraShot FileObserver FileSystem FileSystem FMServer FTP FTPManager InjectApp Keylog... |
279 | ZxShell Backdoor. | 57,836 | 57,920 | 85 | data/reports_final/0279.txt | ZxShell Backdoor.
APT.Viper FE_APT_VIPER SPECIAL REPORT DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION 63 TECHNICAL ANNEX APT41 IOCs Table 16.
CRACKSHOT File MD5 File SHA1 File SHA256 04fb0ccf3ef309b1cd587f609ab0e81e 44260a1dfd92922a621124640015160e621f32d5 993d14d00b1463519fea78ca65d852966 3f4... |
280 | These include the following: IXESHE. | 57,921 | 58,053 | 133 | data/reports_final/0280.txt | These include the following: IXESHE.
The IXESHE campaign is known for targeting East Asian governments, electronics manufacturers, and telecommunications firms.
We released a white paper discussing this campaign.1 IXESHE has been active since 2012.
ELISE.
This recently discovered campaign also targets government agenci... |
281 | IXESHE: An APT Campaign. | 58,054 | 58,265 | 212 | data/reports_final/0281.txt | IXESHE: An APT Campaign.
Last accesed August 30, 2013.
http://www.trendmicro.
com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_ixeshe.pdf 2 Trend Micro Incorporated.
(
2013).
Trend Micro Incorporated Research Paper The Taidoor Campaign: An In-Depth Analysis.
Last accessed August 30, 2013.
http://www.tren... |
282 | Operation Hangover: Unveiling an Indian Cyberattack Infrastructure. | 58,266 | 58,602 | 337 | data/reports_final/0282.txt | Operation Hangover: Unveiling an Indian Cyberattack Infrastructure.
May 2013.
39 Finkle, J.
(4 Aug 2011) State actor behind slew of cyber attacks, Reuters.
FireEye, Inc. World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Todays Advanced Cyber Attacks 11 FireEye believes that many of these regional economic org... |
283 | Analyst note on ACTINIUM IOCs: ACTINIUM registers and administers a large amount of infrastructure. | 58,603 | 59,455 | 853 | data/reports_final/0283.txt | Analyst note on ACTINIUM IOCs: ACTINIUM registers and administers a large amount of infrastructure.
Its not always possible to accurately determine what malicious component connects to which C2 infrastructure.
MSTIC has observed cases where the same C2 is used for different components (for example, corolain[.
]ru).
Exa... |
284 | Above: The decoding loop Upon successful execution this code drops a Word document and a Visual Basic script. | 59,456 | 59,608 | 153 | data/reports_final/0284.txt | Above: The decoding loop Upon successful execution this code drops a Word document and a Visual Basic script.
The Word document is displayed to the user to avoid arousing any suspicion while the script is executed in the background.
Unusual for many exploit campaigns, the names of the dropped files vary for example HyH... |
285 | Unlocker: Apparently a rented server at AS52048 DATACLUB DataClub S.A. Latvia. | 59,609 | 59,905 | 297 | data/reports_final/0285.txt | Unlocker: Apparently a rented server at AS52048 DATACLUB DataClub S.A. Latvia.
Traffic from this IP had a very specific purpose: It unlocked routers for proxying in connection with the sending of phishing emails.
In the wild we observed this IP connect to our router on the malware management port and specify a SOCKSS p... |
286 | Hostnames IP addresses Operational Status ns1[.]rootdnservers[. | 59,906 | 59,935 | 30 | data/reports_final/0286.txt | Hostnames IP addresses Operational Status ns1[.]rootdnservers[.
]com.
45[.]32[.]100[.
]62 Active ns2[.]rootdnservers[.
]com.
45[.]32[.]100[.
]62 Active ns1[.]intersecdns[.
]com 95[.]179[.]150[.
]101 Inactive ns2[.]intersecdns[.
]com 95[.]179[.]150[.
]101 Inactive New IP addresses associated with man-in-the-middle activ... |
287 | Indicators of compromise IP address Characterization Date Range 185[.]64[.]105[. | 59,936 | 59,990 | 55 | data/reports_final/0287.txt | Indicators of compromise IP address Characterization Date Range 185[.]64[.]105[.
]100 Operational Node March - April 2019 178[.]17[.]167[.
]51 Operational Node June 2019 95[.]179[.]131[.
]225 Mitm Node April 2019 140[.]82[.]58[.
]253 Mitm Node April 2019 95[.]179[.]156[.
]61 Mitm Node April 2019 196[.]29[.]187[.
]100 M... |
288 | Thegrouphasarelativelysmall footprintcomparedtomassiveoperationssuchasEquation. | 60,035 | 60,545 | 511 | data/reports_final/0288.txt | Thegrouphasarelativelysmall footprintcomparedtomassiveoperationssuchasEquation.
Smallergroupscanhavetheadvantage ofbeingabletostayundertheradarforlongerperiodsoftime,whichiswhathappenedhere.
ThetargetingoftheNaikongroupbytheHellsingAPTisperhapsthemostinterestingpart.
Inthepast, weveseenAPTgroupsaccidentallyhittingeacho... |
289 | [Build][Architecture] Win6.1.7601x86 Malware Version [D_Regsvr32]-v[2.0]. | 60,546 | 60,697 | 152 | data/reports_final/0289.txt | [Build][Architecture] Win6.1.7601x86 Malware Version [D_Regsvr32]-v[2.0].
[7] D_Regsvr32-v2.0.7 Table 6.
Format used for sending information about infected system - HTTP Figure 29.
Process of obtaining PcInfo Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 28 The information is ultimately sent to ... |
290 | Argument String Needed for Execution: 48Ur31h45dGy a. | 60,698 | 61,062 | 365 | data/reports_final/0290.txt | Argument String Needed for Execution: 48Ur31h45dGy a.
Routine for Decoding Argument and Settings Data Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash) 40 The string shown above exists in the binary in the Xor encoded form.
PebbleDash uses two types of decoding routines: A routine of decoding argume... |
291 | Remote Access History: 27.255.81[. | 61,074 | 61,295 | 222 | data/reports_final/0291.txt | Remote Access History: 27.255.81[.
]109:3015 AhnLabs Response The alias and the engine version information of AhnLab products are shown below.
Even if the threat groups activities were recently discovered, AhnLab products may have detected related malware in the past.
The ASEC team is tracking the activities of the gro... |
292 | ]ga/?query5 VBS Malware hxxp://get.seino.p-e[. | 61,296 | 61,451 | 156 | data/reports_final/0292.txt | ]ga/?query5 VBS Malware hxxp://get.seino.p-e[.
]kr Downloader hxxp://ai.woani[.
]ml hxxp://app.veryton[.
]ml hxxp://biz.gooroomee[.
]ml hxxp://com.dshec[.
]ml hxxp://eastsea.or[.
]kr hxxp://hao.aini.pe[.
]hu hxxp://imap.pamik[.
]cf hxxp://love.krnvc[.
]ga hxxp://pc.ac-kr.esy[.
]es Analysis Report of Kimsuky Groups APT ... |
293 | See the Notable Malware and Tools section for additional detail. | 61,452 | 61,557 | 106 | data/reports_final/0293.txt | See the Notable Malware and Tools section for additional detail.
Initial Reconnaissance / Initial Compromise Mandiant has observed UNC2596 frequently leverage vulnerabilities affecting public-facing Microsoft Exchange infrastructure as an initial compromise vector in recent COLDDRAW intrusions s where the initial vecto... |
294 | Recent Cozyduke APT activity attracted significant attention in the news: Sources: State Dept. | 61,558 | 61,597 | 40 | data/reports_final/0294.txt | Recent Cozyduke APT activity attracted significant attention in the news: Sources: State Dept.
hack the worst ever White House computer network hacked Three Months Later, State Department Hasnt Rooted Out Hackers http://securelist.com/blog/69731/the-cozyduke-apt/ 4/21/2015 The CozyDuke APT - Securelist https://www.ever... |
295 | Below we compare Show.dll with the OnionDuke sample MD5: c8eb6040fd02d77660d19057a38ff769. | 61,598 | 61,706 | 109 | data/reports_final/0295.txt | Below we compare Show.dll with the OnionDuke sample MD5: c8eb6040fd02d77660d19057a38ff769.
Both have exactly the same export tables and appear to be called internally UserCache.dll: This seems to indicate the authors of OnionDuke and Cozy Bear are the same, or working together.
Another interesting comparison of two oth... |
296 | next it checks if this string contains one of the following substrings: VmWare QemU 192.168.100. | 61,707 | 61,747 | 41 | data/reports_final/0296.txt | next it checks if this string contains one of the following substrings: VmWare QemU 192.168.100.
If any of these strings is found, the module terminates.
after that, there is a hardcoded value of 10, which delays further execution of the module for 10 seconds.
then the module attempts to delete some other, prob- ably o... |
297 | string encryption/decryption functions use the following keys: Microsoft Corporation. | 61,748 | 61,868 | 121 | data/reports_final/0297.txt | string encryption/decryption functions use the following keys: Microsoft Corporation.
All rights reserved.
90ed768ab728a0f74a4b957c31f1a213 63 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com the module works with all firefox versions prior to Mozilla Firefox 12.0.
depend- ing on version of firefo... |
298 | CLEARONSTART Undoes previous ONSTART command. | 61,893 | 62,114 | 222 | data/reports_final/0298.txt | CLEARONSTART Undoes previous ONSTART command.
5/7 ARP Runs unavailable ARP module (uncparse.dll unavailable).
This module stores data in a file internally named arpSniff.pcap.
AUTO Automatically looks for updates of predefined files.
MANUAL Files in the specified directory are searched using the .upd pattern, all fou... |
299 | ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Malware analysis by Morgan Marquis-Boire and Bill Marczak. | 62,115 | 62,238 | 124 | data/reports_final/0299.txt | ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Malware analysis by Morgan Marquis-Boire and Bill Marczak.
Assistance from Seth Hardy and Harry Tuttle gratefully received.
Special thanks to John Scott-Railton.
Thanks to Marcia Hofmann and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF).
We would also like to acknowledge Privacy International for their cont... |
300 | Operation Ghost . | 62,239 | 62,502 | 264 | data/reports_final/0300.txt | Operation Ghost .
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7 3.2 Attribution to the Dukes .
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8 3.3 Tactics and tools .
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